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1.) Introduction 
 
“One main response to insecurity is to seek reaffirmation of one’s identity by drawing closer 
to any collective that is perceived as being able to reduce insecurity and existential anxiety. 
The combination of religion and nationalism is a particularly powerful response (‘identity-
signifier’) in times of rapid change and uncertain futures, and is therefore more likely than 
other identity constructions to arise during crises of ontological insecurity” (Kinnvall 2004: 
741-767). 
 
Unlike the Cold War era, in which realist perceptions about the global world order were 
prevalent, the explanation of roots of conflicts has since then increasingly shifted towards 
questions of culture and ethnicity. According to Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), who 
introduced the notion of a clash of civilization, civilizations are fundamentally characterized 
by their respective religions. In concrete terms, it became a widely shared assumption that 
classical (realist) conflicts caused by economic, territorial or power-related motives were 
outdated. This thesis aims to build its argumentation on this “revitalization of religion” while 
aiming to assess the two opposing roles of Israelis and Palestinians as securitizing actors, 
which consistently invoke religion in their securitizing policies (Laustsen/Waever 2000: 705). 
These are fueled by myths and opposing identities that create an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
phenomenon.  The human need for identity and its social construction is thus key for the 
further analysis. Taking a starting point from Lucke’s and McLarren’s (2017) work, the 
question is raised whether and how religion should be included within the securitizing 
framework. This work is based on the idea that religion is easily securitized by actors who 
base their entire argumentation on an existential threat posed by the ‘enemy’ against them.  
The thesis confronts the fact that the role of the transcendental as key attribute of positions 
such as the Israeli and Palestinian ones has rarely been examined thoroughly in the field of 
International Relations (IR) theory. Nevertheless, I argue that religion represents a powerful 
asset of unrivaled validity. More specifically, it mobilizes an audience, which in the course of 
a securitization process evolves into the major supporter for certain policies. To include the 
divine in order to convince the other always contains a moral correctness of a higher sphere 
that makes it difficult to oppose the cause. This is also to be observed in the Israeli case where 
it is “the state itself”, which becomes legitimized by religion (Fox/Sandler 2004: 43). What is 
more, disagreements based on religious grounds can also lead to fatal outcomes, such as the 
assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 by an opponent of the Oslo Peace 
Process. While “power and pragmatism” are still perceived as the dominating forces in 
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international relations, identity has become an influential factor and religion, as one of the 
most crucial normative concerns as I will argue, is a significant component of identity 
(Fox/Sandler 2004: 45).  
On the one hand, the story of Abraham and his descendants as the founding fathers and 
prophets of the religion primarily influence Judaism. The Old Testament “tells of the years in 
slavery in Egypt and God’s miraculous efforts to free the Jews followed by the giving of the 
law and wandering in the Sinai desert, which helped to forge the Jews into a nation” 
(Fox/Sandler 2004: 51). These are the biblical images, on which religious Zionism and 
mobilization have been able to flourish. They have nurtured the necessity to keep the ‘Jewish 
land’ in preparation of the coming of the messiah. On the other hand, the Palestinians’ claim 
concerning the same land is also religiously motivated. This is especially true for Jerusalem, 
which as holy city for the Muslim believers should remain in Islamic hands. Religious 
ideologies have thus contributed to the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, which, 
especially since the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, has attained international 
relevance. Between 610 and 1945, there are many references, which can be used as testimony 
for a peaceful coexistence of both Muslims and Jews. This is reflected in the cultural and 
ethnic similarities between both religious groups concerning holidays or when considering the 
Jewish-Muslim convivencia1 in Castilian Spain. Both groups are closely intertwined as the 
origin of Ramadan in Yom Kippur shows, or the fact that the counterpart of Suleiman, son of 
the Prophet Dawud in the Qu’ran is King Solomon, son of King David in the Bible. 
While secular forces have influenced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a religious impact cannot 
be denied. A concrete example is the visit of Israeli politician Ariel Sharon to the Temple 
Mount in 2000, which resulted in serious troubles as the place is of holy importance to Jews 
and Muslims. Religious legitimacy plays a role on many secular Israelis; it offers ground for 
the Palestinian argumentation against the Israeli settlements of the land and provides a 
messianic justification for Zionistic aspirations (Fox/Sandler 2004: 61). With this work, I will 
argue that policies towards Israel have never been seen fully separate from the disputes over 
religion throughout the history of the Jewish state. Concrete examples are the holy sites whose 
values are part of the spiritual character of the state. There is a huge burden on any political 
leader. An Israeli or Palestinian leader who would have given up the Temple Mount in a 
peace settlement would have been likely removed from office; there is constraint and little 
                                                          
1 The convivencia describes an era of tolerant and peaceful coexistence of Muslims, Jews and Christians in 
Castilian Spain from the early eighth century until the expulsion of the Jews in 1492.  
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room for compromise, given the domestic and international pressure on the issue. My main 
research question I want to analyze shall therefore be the following: To which extent does 
religion, as important yet underestimated factor in the field of international relations theory, 
fuel the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians? 
The following explorative chapters aim to examine the role of religion in securitization 
processes that enabled the maintenance of the Israeli and Palestinian identities, which 
characterize themselves in opposition to the other. Therefore, this work is structured as 
follows: first, a section on the theoretical frameworks is presented. This examines the role of 
religion in IR, followed by a section on the fundamentals of Securitization theory and 
subsequently the question, whether the establishment of a separate religious sector, which 
exclusively looks at sacred referent objects, is a legitimate claim. The methodology on which 
the empirical part will mainly be based upon is discourse analysis with a strong emphasis on 
historical representations. Both approaches can be found in “Qualitative Methods in 
International Relations: A Pluralist Guide” (2008) by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash. To 
conduct the study, first the construction of Israeli and Palestinian security discourses is 
analyzed, followed by a section on the religious attributes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
history. This is crucial, as diverging historical perspectives offer the valid ground on which 
biblical references can become persuasive for the respective audience. In order to show the 
religious impact, speech acts by David Ben-Gurion, Yasser Arafat and Benjamin Netanyahu 
are analyzed. The cases are chosen to display a spectrum of religious securitization through 
speech acts. While this work does not aim to show that every speech act delivered by an 
Israeli or Palestinian political leader is constructed around a transcendental justification, I 
intend to demonstrate that religious securitization can be found in the analyzed speeches, 
which were held at different historical times.  The conclusion then summarizes and reflects 
the findings of the study by putting them into context and formulating possible policy advices 
and notions on how to amend IR’s approach towards religion since theoretical amendments 
can become a fruitful ground for the right assessment of real world conflicts characterized by 
religious frictions.  
 
2.) Theoretical Frameworks 
2.1) Religion in International Relations  
Discussing religion as a factor in political science - and more specifically in IR - represents a 
particularly difficult challenge which stems from the fact that it has constantly been framed as 
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“subcategory” of  more important political elements, such as society, civilizations or 
institutions (Fox/Sandler 2004: 9). The authors further argue that this tendency is even more 
prevalent in the field of International Relations than in other social sciences. The question 
remains: Why does IR theory not include religion? Realism, as possibly the most famous 
paradigm amongst IR approaches, focuses on the balance of power and on the nation state as 
static black box, which consistently aims to increase its (military) capabilities in a global order 
characterized by insecurity. Such an image, characterized by material attributes, correlates 
with the quantitatively intangible impact that religion can offer. As Bassiouney (2009) argues, 
the difficulty of measuring a religious influence also lies in the fact that it “does not stand in 
isolation but is connected to other categories” (Bassiouney 2001: 104). Critics of religion 
could argue that the impossibility of using quantitative research methods whilst dealing with 
religion makes it an inappropriate element for studying world politics. Nonetheless, in the 
Arab world specifically, religion is also closely intertwined with the political system of each 
country and is therefore of global political importance (ibid.). Thus, I argue that not fully 
including religion in the field of IR in the near future will put the theory’s authenticity and 
applicability at stake.  
Fox and Sandler (2004) assessed religion as overlooked dimension in IR and came to the 
conclusion that the most prominent reason for its absence can be found in the theory’s 
Western-centrism. Western social and political scientists substituted religion as least rational 
element with ideals of the European age of Enlightenment. The assumption that religion is of 
outdated character and should be replaced with the Enlightenment’s image of the modern state 
has its roots in Western culture and socialization. As noted by Robert Wuthnow, social 
theories that support modernism have rather contributed to banishing religion as an area of 
influence than questioning its social impact (Thomas 2005: 50). Nonetheless, the West’s 
expectation that ‘the rest’ of the world needs to absorb the secular ideas and assimilate 
modernity has failed as religious backlashes against Western indoctrination have been 
widespread.  
Often dismissed as a myth and rejected as a theory, spirituality and religion frequently 
represent the only capable forces to create an image of the modern world based on humans’ 
emotional aspirations and is thus more than just reactionary. When looking closely at different 
religious groups, Buddhism or Hinduism are rapidly linked with peace and anti-violence 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, forms of religious intolerance and violence also occur in countries 
in which these religions prevail, which leads to the hypothesis that religion combines both the 
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potential for conflict reduction and for its deterioration and that political actors and the 
international system are subsequently affected by it. This is what R. Scott Appleby has called 
the “ambivalence of the sacred” (Thomas 2005: 121). Therefore, religion has the potential not 
only to further peace, but also to fuel tensions in conflicts of international importance. The 
religious aspect can also increase features of ethnocentrism, which is based on a superior 
sentiment of one group, which sees ‘the other’ threatening own interests and even existence. 
The other’s role fuels own feelings of insecurity, and must therefore be taken into account in 
the formation of a collective, confirming identity which rejects ‘the enemy’ in a next step. 
This enemy is portrayed in dehumanizing ways as barbaric or as vermin (Thomas 2005: 130). 
Such a representation has its origin in the uncertainty around a political system or in a 
territorial insecurity as it is the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This insecurity impedes 
a natural intercourse with the own identity which in return is portrayed as necessary to be 
defended. This idea is based on the narrative of a socially constructed entity, which is to be 
viewed ethnically, culturally, or as in the Israeli-Palestinian case, as I will argue primarily 
religiously connoted. Religious traditions and ways of thinking function here as catalysts for 
the claim to implement the own social reality. The conflict parties stress the differences 
between them and represent their specific religious interpretation as solely valid. At this point, 
a “chain reaction of reciprocal violence” is initiated (Thomas 2005: 137). According to Rene 
Girard, the main factors considered in this context are “[a] scapegoat, sacrificial mechanism, 
the sacrificial crisis, apocalyptic violence and contagious violence" (Thomas 2005: 132). It is 
interesting to note that, based on these factors, those who feel threatened redefine themselves 
and the other on the basis of a cultural, ethnic or religious line, depending on the degree of 
perceived existential danger (Thomas 2005: 135). Supporters of these assumptions conclude 
that 
“[t]he political crisis observed by political scientists is about how people respond, and the cultural or 
religious crisis is about why they respond the way they do – by seeking out scapegoats – and not in 
some other way, a way arguably more deeply consistent with their religious traditions” (Thomas 2005: 
136). 
  
Unless there is sufficient contact between the involved actors and thus dialogue potential, due 
to the differences, the resulting uncertainty will lead to possible violence, which receives its 
support from religious reasoning. While defining the impact of religion, particularly in the 
field of IR, will continue to pose a challenge, crucial preconditions need to be taken into 
consideration. First, the field of International Relations is dominated by Western scholars, 
who apply their assumptions about international relations to the West and non-West according 
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to their Western experiences. Second, the discipline, which aims to address global politics, 
has yet to achieve a postcolonial balance. Third, as long as Westerners widely dominate the 
discipline, a shift towards a religious-friendly IR appears unlikely to occur. Nonetheless, the 
events of the September 11, 2001 attack of the World Trade Center made it difficult to 
overlook religion that can influence the international status quo as essential part of 
international relations (Fox/Sandler 2004). “It also destroyed the West’s ruling myth – the 
belief that modernity, that is, Western modernity, is a single global condition, the global home 
for all of us“ (Thomas 2005: 52). Simultaneously, major elements within IR like many forms 
of nationalism are based upon religious identities, whose contents cannot be explained by 
secular ideologies, since religious identities are based on the notion of faith and thus guided 
by a godly voice.   
To sum up, religion has been largely marginalized in International Relations theory. 
“Adopting what is variously called traditional religion, religious extremism, or fundamentalism is 
considered to be like other forms of ‘irrationalism’, ideological extremism, or reactionary politics – 
fascism or Nazism” (Thomas 2005: 48). 
Western IR scholars reveal a crucial lack in approaching the actual content of religion as they 
focus solely on how religion is structured and do not follow the question of what the belief 
itself is actually constituted (Thomas 2005: 53). It is falsely portrayed as measure to guarantee 
security that 
“[r]eligion must be disciplined by the state – privatized, marginalized, and nationalized as a form of 
global order and social cohesion, or religion must be overcome by a global or cosmopolitan ethic as 
the basis of international order” (Thomas 2005: 54).  
 
2.2) Fundamentals of Securitization  
The approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shall be embedded in the so-called 
securitization theory. According to the Copenhagen School, which had a significant impact on 
the theory’s terminology, the basis of securitization consists in responding to the question 
who can securitize what and under which conditions. McDonald (2008) answers this question 
in the following:  
“Securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of 
a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) 
enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue” 
(McDonald 2008: 567). 
Therefore, the first step is to answer how security is understood at all. Buzan et al. assume 
that “security is about survival“, which comes into play when a designated referent object is 
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confronted with a subjectively perceived existential threat as outcome of interactions among 
units (states, collective identities, religions, etc.) (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Simultaneously, the 
terminology stands for an authorized move to take politics beyond the normally binding rules 
and situate an issue “as a special kind of politics […] above politics” requiring and justifying 
emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). The precondition of securitization being socially 
constructed needs to be understood as predisposition as well as the fact that it does not apply 
to rational universalism. In other words, security is not approached objectively and the threat 
created represents the outcome of an intersubjective process.  
This thesis will follow Buzan et al.’s assumption that “[i]nternational security is mostly about 
how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threat and vulnerabilities” (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 10). Opposing the traditionalists’ understanding of security issues who mainly 
equate security with military issues and thus the use of force, Buzan et al. (1998) present and 
discuss four more sectors besides the military: the environmental, economic, societal and 
political sector. While securitization always deals with an existential threat directed at a 
particular referent object, threats differ in their nature and are thus rooted in particular sectors. 
Subsequently, sectors help to identify which specific characteristics of threats and referent 
objects are dealt with in the various areas.  
As my analysis focuses on the recurring topic of religion as part of securitizing moves in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, my interest is focused on two crucial features that are part of the 
securitizing process: the audience and the respective speech act. The predisposition for a 
successful security act is a general acceptance and openness of an audience such as the civil 
society, which in the Israeli-Palestinian case must be willing to understand religion as a 
relevant issue for the survival of their respective nation. “The security act is negotiated 
between securitizer and audience” while the final decision on a successful securitization rests 
with the audience (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). The success of a speech act therefore depends on 
the resonance of the audience in combination with a certain usage of language by a political 
authority, which aims to create a “plot that includes [an] existential threat, [a] point of no 
return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). By referring to socially and, in this 
case, religiously important objects, an existential threat is created. Despite the rather 
positively perceived connotations of the term “security”, this work agrees with Buzan et al.’s 
(1998) assumption that “security should not be thought of too easily as always good” (Buzan 
et al. 1998: 4). The overarching aim should therefore be to achieve de-securitization. In 
concrete terms, issues that were projected into the emergency mode should be tried to move 
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back “into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). 
Only if this is given, a shift within the political culture, which is of utmost relevance for the 
possibility of a sustainable peace process, will succeed.  
 
2.3)  Sacred Referent Objects: Approaching an Independent Religious Sector  
As already discussed in the previous chapter, something only turns into a security act when it 
becomes labeled as such. The next step in this study is to examine the extent to which 
religiously connoted securitization happens, and if so, whether its extent does require a 
separate sector of investigation. While agreeing with Laustsen and Waever (2000), I argue 
that religion cannot be reflected to a sufficient degree within the societal sector since it would 
consider religion amongst “regional identification, clans, extended family” instead of 
exclusively elaborating on it based on its influential interconnection with the divine 
(Laustsen/Waever 2000: 709). Yet the necessity to deal with religion separately is established 
due to the fact that when we talk about religion as securitizing object we start dealing with 
“true faith” (Laustsen/Waever 2000: 709). The dilemma that arises with positioning religion 
in the societal sector is that religion needs to be covered as an own sphere and should not be 
fully absorbed within the field of community or identity. Otherwise, religion is impoverished 
and its claim to bridge the earthly and the transcendental which makes it so powerful and 
unpredictable as a separate sector becomes obsolete.  
As elaborated previously, discussing religion within the field of IR represents a particularly 
difficult challenge as the peace of Westphalia, the founding principle of many IR thoughts, is 
perceived as the end of an era, which tolerated religion as part of the theory. Nonetheless, 
“religion is [still] present at all levels of analysis which the field of IR examines – it is 
mentioned in international declarations; it plays a role in inter-state conflicts; religion is 
included in foreign policy debates; and it is found in the lives of individual statesmen” 
(Lucke/McLarren 2017: 2).  It should be of particular interest that fields of security practice, 
which are often described as “only political” can imply securitized religion which is not 
mentioned as such but which has wide implications for the study of securitization 
(Laustsen/Waever 2000: 706). A new urgency of survival comes into play that is linked to a 
higher sphere and has thus the potential of extraordinary legitimization through political 
leaders who make use of it. In other words, religion becomes easily securitized as it already 
implies the question of existence itself and the interconnection with the divine.  
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If we take a starting point from the argument of true faith, the predisposition must imply the 
understanding that the phenomenon of religion can only be fully comprehended by “those 
confronting and practicing it” (Laustsen/Waever 2000: 710). In the attempt of trying to equate 
religion with social forces, scholars would fail in doing justice to the former. Religion cannot 
be approached “through the work of reason” (Laustsen/Waever 2000: 712).  It rather creates a 
discourse in which the main character is God and thus a divine entity that does not owe 
justification to human beings. The transcendental has its own definitions and cannot be simply 
adjusted to the normality of an earthly social life. If faith is the referent object of a 
securitizing process, the interconnection between the immanent and transcendental realm 
becomes key to sacralize “objects, persons, and practices” which subsequently become 
“endowed with divine power” (Laustsen/Waever 2000: 719). Applied to a conflict in which 
the sacred endowment becomes endangered by the opponent, sacred objects turn rapidly into 
existential threats demanding extraordinary policy measures and thus securitization. 
Subsequently, the existential threat becomes equated with the question of survival, which 
mobilizes the respective audience.  As long as faith is perceived as threatened by an opposed 
religious discourse, faith becomes an unpredictable securitization catalyst.  
In “The Religious Challenge to Securitization Theory” (2014), Mona Sheikh takes a different 
approach than Laustsen and Waever by focusing on religion’s cross-sector relevance. She 
suggests to re-widen the scope of analysis of a securitization theory that addresses the sole 
faith as referent object. This however is contrary to the narrowing process by Laustsen and 
Waever, who argue in favor of a separate religious sector. While this thesis builds on their 
conclusion, it agrees with Sheikh that religious discourses not only defend faith, “but also 
holy places (lands, temples, mosques etc.) or holy law” (Sheikh 2014: 260). In her response to 
Laustsen and Waever, Sheikh also emphasizes this work’s initial assumption that Western-
centric notions to treat religion as apolitical consequently prevent a de-securitization of 
religious conflicts.  
The purpose of this chapter was to elucidate why religion needs its own sector within the 
theory of securitization. I agree with Laustsen and Waever (2000) that it is of fundamental 
importance to assimilate an additional religious sector, which subsequently could legitimize 
arguments related to faith. Only if religion is accepted as religion, an in-depth analysis of 
primarily religious conflicts can become fruitful. On the basis of the aforementioned 
arguments, the extraordinary potential of an overlapping religious and security discourse 
cannot be denied. To formulate something as political action does not make a conflict as the 
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Israeli-Palestinian one, in which ideologies are fueled with securitized religion based on 
existential threats, less of a religious encounter. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the existing 
insecurity on both sides must be of central importance for the further analysis as well as the 
question whether the need of a divine entity “barring the subject” is remarkably high in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case (Laustsen/Waever 2000: 728). In order to understand religious 
securitization, it is crucial for IR scholars to examine the transcendental entity as main 
referent actor, which in return diminishes the scope of human justifications of political events. 
In concrete terms, an areligious IR might imply the greatest obstacle for the understanding of 
conflicts whose nature constitutes of religious attributes. Religion seems to be easily 
securitized due to the nature of its discourse since, as in this case, it implies the question of an 
existence defended by a godly justification. Its securitization is always linked to a perceived 
threat by one conflict party and is thus not arbitrary. Assessing religion within the frameworks 
provided by IR, which is known for its secularist aspirations, nevertheless stays difficult since 
religious discourses imply a specific complexity due to the limitation of human knowledge 
and the omniscience of a God, which are crucial characteristics that need to be accepted 
before an analysis of a religious conflict can take place successfully. 
 
3.) The construction of Israeli and Palestinian Security discourses 
The subsequent analysis is built on Thierry Balzacq’s assumption in “The three faces of 
securitization: Political agency, audience and context” (2005), where he addresses the 
importance of certain circumstances being favorably configured in order for securitization to 
be successful. A sole speech act is only able to achieve its desired effect on the audience by 
aligning with an external context. It can be argued that by focusing exclusively on the 
constitution of a speech act, historical dynamics are wrongly excluded and thus an important 
perspective on world politics not considered. Therefore, the religious positions strengthened 
by crucial historical events as important external contexts in the Israeli-Palestinian case shall 
be the center of attention in the following elaboration, which serves to show the impact of 
non-linguistic variables and their interdependence with the actual speech acts. In short, I argue 
that religious attributes in the Israeli and Palestinian attitudes embedded in historical contexts 
represent Balzacq’s facilitating conditions for a successful securitization. 
This chapter aims to show how the historical past of Israelis and Palestinians contributes to 
the construction of security discourses related to faith, which are held by Israeli and 
Palestinian political leaders when addressing their respective societies or the international 
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community. According to Bezen Balamir Coskun, “rival visions of the past” characterize the 
interaction between both protagonists (Coskun 2010: 281). Historians have become 
combatants as they stress their respective work, which is fueled by national myths and 
religious justifications that undermine the other’s history writing. The aftermath of the 1948 
and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars became the ground on which Israeli and Palestinian security 
discourses, based on the instrumentalization of historical narratives were able to flourish. The 
respective power elite has further continually phrased the religious explanation and position 
of the other as existential threat.  
This thesis argues that securitization within a religious sector occurs in maintaining the own 
identity while opposing the other’s. In a securitization process - as it is the case in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict - it seems that “all sorts of means [are] employed to back the official 
security discourse regarding the other” (Coskun 2010: 285). Therefore, the writing and 
teaching of particular history obtains a crucial role within the securitization process. This is 
the case since different accounts of the same history have been produced, in which obtaining 
religious legitimization is key for each group’s survival. Religious claims have determined 
historical interpretations on both the Israeli and Palestinian side and have characterized 
official historiographies that are mentioned in discourses of policy makers, who aim to 
securitize the opponent in their respective speech acts. Thus, the overlapping historical and 
religious roots of the problem cannot be denied as it has been a question of responsibility and 
definition of certain political events from the beginning. 
On the one hand, Israeli security discourses and their link to history are built on “the 
competing struggles for statehood”, which are starting and key point for any argumentation 
(ibid.). Both Israelis and Palestinians declare their national memory as outcome of the battle 
for legitimate nation-building. According to Israeli leaders, Israel sought to establish “peace 
but met only rejection and hatred from the Arabs” both in 1948 and 1967 (ibid.). They argue 
that based on the Arab hostilities experienced, Israel was forced to include the issue of 
political security. Furthermore, the Zionist narrative stresses that Israel had no active role in 
the massive Palestinian refugee problem during the 1948 war. On top, the Israelis have 
defended the narrative that it was solely the Arabs’ responsibility, who launched the war and 
encouraged Arabs to leave. “[A]ny counter-narrative was considered taboo” (Coskun 2010: 
288).  
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Within this context, Ronnie Olesker’s analysis (2014) focuses on discriminatory legislation 
between 2000 and 2012 by the Israeli Knesset and at the political perception of the Israeli 
public before and after the second intifada. In this context, it is demonstrated how Israeli 
discriminatory laws fuel a continuous securitization of the Palestinian minorities while the 
question, whether securitization or de-securitization prevails is still reserved exclusively for 
the political elites to answer. As the laws are passed, Israel’s political elite seeks to 
demonstrate how threats to the hegemony of Jewish identity are simultaneously existential 
dangers to national security. This approach shows even more, why a de-securitization of the 
Palestinian minority is unlikely to occur. Securitization, as a process negotiated between 
enunciator and audience, seems easily implemented here as the Israeli Jewish public has 
accepted the discriminatory laws and has perceived them as justified in response to the 
Palestinian uprisings during the Second Intifada or the October riots in 2000. Securitization 
theory seems particularly applicable, as it has become a question about securing the Jewish 
homeland to guarantee the continued existence and survival of Jews, which has provided the 
ground for securitizing moves by the Israeli political elite. Symptomatic of this is the fact that 
Israel has declared its state as one of emergency, a status, “which has existed in Israel since 
independence” (Olesker 2014: 376). The failure of the Oslo peace process, the assassination 
of Rabin in 1995, who aimed to improve the status of the Palestinian minority and the 
following intifada, provided the policy window for Israeli legislators to implement 
securitization moves through legal means. These include amongst others the Illegal Resident 
Assistant Prohibition Law from 2005, which punishes employers “who provide aid or shelter 
to illegal Palestinian workers” (ibid.).  
On the other hand, Palestinian history writing has declared Israeli psychological and armed 
warfare as cause for the Palestinian flight from their land. Despite also identifying themselves 
with a greater Arab nation, Palestinians explicitly stress their “belonging to a land they called 
Filastuna (Palestine)” (Said 1980: 118). They hold Israel responsible for the Palestinian 
refugee problem and encourage a security discourse, which denies Israeli claims on Palestine. 
As Coskun (2010) elaborates, the Israeli occupation had a strengthening impact on Palestinian 
nationalism and on the claims of a greater Muslim nation, which sees an opportunity in the 
1967 defeat to portray the State of Israel as existential threat in their securitization discourses, 
in which Israel’s control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip is severely 
criticized. Within this context, Yasser Arafat represents a powerful figure, who contributed 
rhetorically to equate the Palestinian struggle with the worldwide fight against “Zionism, 
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colonialism and international imperialism” (Coskun 2010: 290). In this sense, he underlined 
the necessity to keep resisting Israeli ‘colonialism’ in order to liberate the Palestinian 
fatherland. Moreover, the defeat of the Arab states in the war with Israel in 1967 can be seen 
“as a bankruptcy of secular Arab nationalist movements and of state authorities” since it 
paved the way for radical religious movements and their own visions of state affairs 
(Eickelmann 1998: 306). While there is no concrete chronological parallelism to the 
emergence of radical Judaism on the other side, after 1973 and after at that time Egyptian 
president Anwar el-Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem to seek a permanent peace settlement with 
Israel, a greater disposition to the ideas of radical Judaism could be observed (ibid.).  
First, Israelis and Palestinians have identified each other exclusively in a negative sense, 
which has resulted in “a vicious cycle of securitization” of the other (ibid.). Second, such an 
approach characterized by disunity and hatred have made them ignore shared knowledge, 
insecurities and each other’s needs and has thus decreased the potential for reconciliation. 
Nonetheless, a generation of historians who portray both sides also as neighbors and future 
partners could contribute to a normalization and therefore de-securitization of the conflict. 
Within this context, the Copenhagen School introduces three options to achieve the latter: 
“not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place; once an issue is securitized, to try not to 
generate security dilemmas and vicious circles; and to move security issues back into normal politics” 
(Waever 2000: 253).  
As the first two options cannot be fulfilled anymore, the last one that deals with moving 
security policies back into the normal realm of politics seems the most realizable. 
Nevertheless, the most difficult part is to achieve a precondition in which ubiquitous 
acceptance regarding the coexistence of both identities prevails. There must be tolerance 
regarding the differences and towards their possible incompatibility (Coskun 2010: 292). As 
both identities claim the other to pose an existential threat against the own identity, at least in 
the near future, the success of a reconciliatory process seems still unlikely to occur. 
This chapter intended to demonstrate how influential certain historic narratives in 
combination with diverging religious perspectives for the formation of the public opinion are, 
especially when they become targets of influential political leaders aiming to demonstrate the 
incompatibility of both identities while implying the fear of one identity being at stake. 
Despite a rather unpredictable forecast for a reconciliatory process in the future, it is 
important to state that there have been important changes in mentality and narrative that have 
become visible when analyzing the reproduction of historical events in history textbooks. For 
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example, there was a revolutionary shift in moving away from the view “that the Palestinians 
left their lands as a result of Arab orders to leave” (Coskun 2010: 294). In a documentary 
called “Revival” and released by the Israeli Ministry of Communication in 1998, it was 
revealed that Jewish forces had the “operational upper hand” when passing orders for the 
Palestinians to leave (ibid.). Furthermore, the question of massacres by Jewish forces was part 
of the discussion. Nonetheless and with the conflict being currently fueled again by different 
political leaders as well as with the continuation of the Jewish settlements, a development 
towards mutual understanding, tolerance and eventual peace seems even more unlikely these 
days.    
 
4.) The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
4.1) Religion in the Middle East 
As Haynes (2007) elaborates, the Middle East represents the region in which the impact of 
various religious traditions such as Judaism in Israel, Shia Islam in Iran and Sunni Islam in 
Saudi Arabia can be examined. It further epitomizes the birthplace of the three main world 
religions: Judaism, Christianism and Islam (Korany 2005: 72). Moreover, it shows how 
religious actors or governments themselves influence policies via religious soft power, often 
combined with hard power such as military means or economic sanctions. As Fox and Sandler 
have noted, religion has “significant influence on domestic policies [and] is a motivating force 
that guides many policy makers” (Fox/Sandler 2004: 168). The Middle East seems explicitly 
prominent for its interaction of politics and religion. This becomes evident when regarding the 
founding of the State of Israel in 1948 as a homeland for the Jews. Since then, Israel’s sense 
of identity has constantly been characterized by its Jewishness. In contrast to Haynes’ idea 
that over the past decades the issue evolved from a secular security issue to a political battle 
of religious dimensions, I aim to show how the conflict has been a question of securitized 
religion starting with the creation of the State of Israel. This approach becomes clear once the 
first speech by David Ben-Gurion from 1946 will be analyzed.  
Many research works regarding religion in the region have been devoted to examining 
militant transnational Muslim movements, such as al-Qaeda (Haynes 2007: 339). It has been 
of less relevance to show how political leaders subliminally mobilize their audience through 
religious rhetoric. In this context, Israel represents a powerful example. It is the only country 
in the world where the majority of citizens follow the Jewish belief and since 1948, the 
successive governments made sure that this feature of Israel’s character has been continually 
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stressed and safeguarded (Sandler 2006). “The nature of Jewish identity has long been 
understood as an overlapping combination of both religion and nation” (Haynes 2007: 342). 
Another point that shows why religion will continue to play a significant role within Israeli 
policy-making can be found in the creation of the state. Both the creation and the Jewish 
nationality are intertwined with a sense of religious identity, making it an explicitly 
vulnerable topic for religious Jews, “some of whom are also political extremists” (Haynes 
2007: 344).  The number of these religious Jews has been growing since the 1970s and will 
continue to do so as many of the haredi (ultra-orthodox) population have large numbers of 
children (ibid.).   
 
4.2) Religious features within the Palestinian Role conception 
As Fox and Sandler (2004) elaborate, the name Al-Aqsa intifada given by the Palestinians to 
the outburst of violence at the end of September 2000 demonstrates the religious exuberance 
of the topic since Al-Aqsa is the name of the mosque situated at the Temple Mount, a place 
holy to both Jews and Muslims. The Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon at that time visited 
the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, which was perceived by the Palestinians as a 
provocation causing the second intifada. This incident strongly indicates how religion as 
crucial component of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship has constantly been of ubiquitous 
character.  
The time of Mandatory Palestine from 1917 until 1948 represented the ground on which 
religion as intervening variable in the conflict could develop its full impact. In this period, the 
1920s were characterized by anti-Jewish themes in the Palestinian rhetoric. Moreover, the 
fundament on which the negative sentiments of the parties against each other were able to 
flourish can be seen rooted in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British 
government promised the Jewish people a national home in Palestine while convincing the 
Arab community that the Zionist aspirations would not put their national home at stake (Sykes 
1967: 11). It was in 1928 when an outbreak of violence was generated by the Palestinian side 
during the Ninth of Av, a Jewish mourning day in remembrance of the destruction of the 
Temples in ancient times. Rumors had been spread that the Jews were altering the Temple 
Mount, which led to the outburst that started during Yom-Kippur Day of Atonement, the 
holiest Jewish holiday of the year. In this context, Fox and Sandler have argued that violence 
at the sites of worship or on religiously significant days continuously strengthened the 
religious character of the conflict.  
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If we start analyzing the religious factors in the Palestinian attitude, we will come across the 
doctrine of dar al-Islam (the home of Islam), which declares land occupied by Islam as part of 
a greater Muslim nation. But contemporary Islamists designated Palestine as waqf, a religious 
endowment. By this definition, the land receives its status as religious trust for all Muslims 
and is even promoted above regular lands that were once occupied by Islamic rulers as during 
the Ottoman Empire (Shepard 2009). Furthermore, “it was toward Jerusalem that the Muslims 
in the beginning directed their prayers” (Fox/Sandler 2004: 139). Jerusalem’s religious 
character has been obvious to many Islamic scholars mainly due to the two mosques, Dome of 
the Rock and Al-Aqsa, built on Temple Mount. This is also the spot from where the prophet 
Muhammad is said to have ascended to heaven based on one phrase in the Qur’an. This has 
created an even stronger link between Islam and the city of Jerusalem. Nonetheless, it was the 
Zionist aspiration in Jerusalem and thus the threat of an occupation by a competing religion, 
which increased the status of the city for the Palestinian party.  
 
4.3) Religious features within the Israeli Role conception 
Despite the fact that there is no universally accepted map of the theological boundaries of the 
Land of Israel (Book of Numbers 34: 7-9; Book of Ezekiel 47: 15-21), its religious core 
cannot be denied. The central mountains area, specifically Judea and Samaria, represent “the 
heart of the ancient Israelite and Judean kingdoms” (Fox/Sandler 2004: 150). No city has 
greater religious significance for the Jewish people than Jerusalem. It was the national capital 
where the kingdoms of David and Solomon resided and where until these days the religious 
component outweighs the historic and political elements due to the following reasons. To 
Zion2, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, Jews have prayed for millennia. It is the place where 
the Jewish Temple had been built and destroyed twice. Furthermore, it is the city in which 
“the Jewish presence has never ceased to exist and where since the mid-nineteenth century the 
Jews have constituted the largest religious community in the city” (ibid.).  
The radicalization of religion seems to have been going hand in hand with the deterioration of 
the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. A concrete example of this development has been the 
Jewish settlement drive. It was in this context, where religious extremists, who simultaneously 
                                                          
2 Zion serves as synonym for the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. It was the seat of the First and Second Temple and 
is often described as the most holy place for the Jewish believers from where they pray for the rebuilding of the 
Holy Temple, the coming of the Messiah and the redemption of the world. It further represents the direction in 
which prayers from all over the world are directed.  
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represented the settlers even aspired to remove the Dome of the Rock to restore the Jewish 
predominance. Most of the hard core settlers on the Jewish side are religious while on the 
Palestinian side, the protagonists of both intifadas were Islamist organizations that strictly 
opposed a peace process. While the fear of a national identity being at stake has been 
ubiquitous, the religious component of the conflict has determined the intensity of the 
conflict. For Islamic fundamentalists, a non-Islamic state on holy Islamic territory has become 
a critical issue throughout the world. To sum up, the religious factor of the conflict can be 
described as catalyst for negative sentiments against each other, which in the Israeli-
Palestinian case have also been influenced by extremist parties. They have invoked religion in 
their approaches to legitimize their ‘superior cause’, such as the settlements on the Jewish side 
and the promotion of the concept of dar-al Islam on the Palestinian side.  
 
5.) Speech Acts 
5.1) David Ben-Gurion – “We will not abandon Zion” 
David Ben-Gurion is considered by many as the founding father of Israel, a title, which he 
earned when announcing the birth of Israel on May 14, 1948. He became the Prime Minister 
of the new Jewish state after working for years towards establishing a Jewish homeland. 
According to Howard M. Sachar (1996), he dedicated all his adult life to achieve sovereignty 
for a Jewish state. His efforts to accomplish this goal are witnessed in his speech from January 
of 1946 in which he addressed the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which comprised 
six British and six American members who heard proposals from Jews and Arabs on how to 
solve the Jewish immigration question to Palestine. This analysis does not aim to show that 
securitization of religion was Ben-Gurion’s sole leitmotif. Nonetheless, it shall demonstrate 
the significant impact of faith as explained by Laustsen and Waever. Ben-Gurion addresses 
Zion as spiritual place and underlines the Jewish people’s claim to have a right of ownership 
of the land based on their love of Zion. According to him, this right can be dated back 
thousands of years ago. It is to keep in mind, that the Committee of Inquiry recommended a 
jointly controlled state and vaguely described a Jewish immigration to keep the balance of the 
region, which deeply frustrated Ben-Gurion.  
In his speech, he stresses the aforementioned rights of the Jewish people since “[we] were 
here long, long before. I myself was. Many thousands preceded me, but we were here far 
earlier still” (Rackers 2004: 29). The anaphora of ‘we were’ that only gets its rhythm shortly 
interrupted by Ben-Gurion’s ‘I myself was’ has the task to support the legitimization of the 
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Jewish claim for an own national homeland. Ben-Gurion demonstrates forcefully through his 
rhetoric that it is explicitly the Jewish people who deserves an own state based on the Jewish 
definition of the respective territory’s holiness. Ben-Gurion’s speech implies crucial 
comparisons, which aim to make it difficult for the Committee to not ascribe him a good will 
in the first place. He equates the actual Palestinian state with a large building in which most of 
the rooms are inhabitable and half-empty. In this context, he describes the Palestinians as 
occupants and describes the Jewish people as former tenants, whose only wish is to go back to 
these inhabitable rooms and repair them.  
What is the sacred referent object according to his words? Clearly, it is the Jewish people and 
their aspiration for a Jewish national home, which, according to him, obtains its legitimization 
through the unique love of Zion and thus by God. In this context, his language takes on yet a 
further degree of gravity.  
“In Arab history there is indeed no such thing as Palestine. […] There is, however, something more 
than Arab history; there is world history and Jewish history and in that history there is a country 
named Judea, or as we call it Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel. We have called it Israel since the days of 
Joshua” (Rackers 2004: 35-36). 
By referring to Joshua, Ben-Gurion ensures to refer to the Bible and thus to a greater history, 
which for him offers a valid justification for a Jewish national home in contrast to a 
Palestinian homeland that was not even mentioned in history. Ben-Gurion’s remarks are 
mirrored in Ben Chorin’s (1991) explanation that there was no Palestinian identity for 
centuries, since Palestine together with Syria formed a geopolitical unit. The Palestinians 
therefore viewed themselves as Arabs. At the same time, the country was always subject to 
foreign powers and empires, so that no explicit state was ever proclaimed and internalized. 
This fuels the interpretation that the Palestinian seek for an own state evolved as response to 
the Zionist movement.  
In order to underline the claim to ‘their land’, the Palestinians have presented their own 
understanding of themselves as the legal successors of the Canaanites and Philistines as the 
origin of their identity. In this context, they further have recalled the military victories of the 
Arabs under Muhammad against Jewish armies around 628 AD. During the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an Arab nationalism, which collided with the 
synchronously evolving Zionism, was expressed for the first time. Nonetheless, the hopes of 
the Palestinians for independence and self-determination as a result of the Ottoman Empire’s 
collapse were ruined by the mandate’s policies of Great Britain and France. However, by 
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assuring independence to the Palestinians, the framework for Palestinian nationalism was 
decisively fueled by the British (Jaeger/Tophoven 2010: 37-38).  
As elaborated in the beginning of this work, while implying religion to justify the own role, it 
becomes difficult for those in the opposition to counterattack (rhetorically) as the divine and 
thereby a higher sphere of knowledge is involved. It becomes even more difficult as Ben-
Gurion declares that “the Land, the Book and the People, are for us forever one” and in his 
words, “an indissoluble bond”, which cannot be destroyed by any material power since the 
“Book” and its message was even taken with the Jewish people into exile (Rackers 2004: 36). 
Subsequently, he asks rhetorically, “Where in the world will you find people loving their 
country as the Jews love Zion?” (Rackers 2004: 37). In this regard, it is important to note that 
Ben-Gurion strictly rejected the notion that Zionism could obtain its same validity without 
immigration to Israel (Sachar 1996: 718).  
In light of the aforementioned description, the Palestinian aspiration for an own national home 
seems to be the ultimate existential threat on which Ben-Gurion bases his argumentation. The 
urgency and the insecurity of the Jewish question makes him feel the need to assign religion 
such significance in his remarks. This sentiment is explicitly striking when he refers to the 
long nights in which he worked in a small village in Palestine and while watching the sky, he 
got reminded of “the Book of Solomon” and finally understood why  “heavens tell the glory 
of God” (Rackers 2004: 38). Furthermore, in his final phrase he underlines that any Jew will 
give up his life “for Jewish independence and for Zion” (Rackers 2004: 39). In short, Ben-
Gurion, in this period leading up to the creation of the Israeli state, clearly identified a sacred 
referent object, while trying to convince the Committee that a Jewish national home needs to 
be implemented based on the ruling from a divine entity.  
 
5.2) Yasser Arafat – “Palestine offers Peace or Armed Resistance”  
Yasser Arafat was the central figure in the struggle for Palestinian autonomy since the 1950s 
and was elected Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1969. His 
speech from 1974 was directed toward the United Nations General Assembly and was mainly 
constructed around the urgency of Palestinian self-determination. It can be described as 
landmark speech in view of the fact that it was one of the first times Palestinian authorities 
were granted the world stage to speak for themselves. Arafat’s remarks contrasted those of 
Israeli diplomats who asserted previously that the land they were awarded by the Partition 
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Plan from 1948 consisted of 75 percent “uninhabited desert” (Rackers 2004: 40).  Arafat calls 
this description a “myth” and articulates the history from a Palestinian perspective (ibid.). The 
Partition Resolution was passed in November 1947 and was shortly followed by Britain’s 
announcement to withdraw all its troops from Palestine by August 1948 (Morris 1999). At the 
end of 1946, there were living around 1.33 million Arabs, of which 1.18 million were 
Muslims and 603,000 Jews, on Palestinian territory (Krämer 2005: 357). The Partition Plan 
assigned 56 percent of Palestine to a prospective Jewish state while the Palestinians were 
awarded 43 percent of the territory. The proposed Arab State was to include western Galilee, 
the highlands of Samaria and Judea, an enclave at Jaffa, and the southern coast starting from 
today’s Ashdod.  It should also encompass what is now known as the Gaza Strip with a 
section of desert along the Egyptian border. The proposed Jewish State would comprise 
eastern Galilee, the coastal plain from Haifa to Rehovot and most of the Negev desert to 
facilitate Jewish settlement. The resolution passed the General Assembly, but without a 
comfortable lead. While the Zionists accepted the resolution immediately, the Palestinians 
declared the resolution’s invalidity. Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion acknowledged the voting as the 
greatest achievement by the Jews “since it became a people” (Morris 1999: 186).  
Arafat begins his remarks by referring to ‘other post-colonial states’ and equates the suffering 
from colonialism with the effects of Zionism by stating: “Our resolve to build a new world is 
fortified - a world free of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all its 
forms, including Zionism” (Rackers 2004: 41). A further degree of gravity is achieved when 
he adds that 
“[j]ust as colonialism […] dignified […] their plunder […], so too did waves of Zionist immigrants 
disguise their purposes as they conquered Palestine. […] Just as colonialism used religion […], so too 
were these methods employed as Palestine was usurped and its people hounded from their national 
homeland” (Rackers 2004: 44).  
The repetitive beginning of both sentences creates an even more dramatic atmosphere, in 
which the Israeli side obtains its characterization as scapegoat. This ‘scapegoat phenomenon’ 
can be described as leitmotif of both speeches as only through the de-valorization of the 
other’s position, the own position gets the chance to become of legitimate character and 
convince other states and institutions of the global importance of their particular truth.  
The sacred referent object here is the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, 
which are given their explicit religious connotation when Arafat refers to the rejection of the 
Partition Plan. In this context, he equates Palestine with “the real mother who refused to 
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permit [King] Solomon to cut her child in two when the other woman claimed the child as 
hers” and thus implies the voice of morality from the Old Testament and with it a divine 
righteousness (Rackers 2004: 45). Significantly, he takes his lead from the Bible and not the 
Qur’an to make his point. Arafat continues by stating that “[our] people cannot but maintain 
the heritage of their ancestors in resisting the invaders […] and in safeguarding the cradle of 
the monotheistic religions” since “as a son of Jerusalem, I treasure […] vivid images of the 
religious brotherhood that was the hallmark of our Holy City before it succumbed to 
catastrophe” (Rackers 2004: 46). He further urges the General Assembly to enable the 
Palestinian people to obtain “their national entity in their own land”, since only then, and this 
is important, will the Palestinian people be able to contribute to uphold Jerusalem as “shrine 
of all religions, free from all terrorism and coercion”, which it was “for so many centuries” 
(Rackers 2004: 50). Arafat closes his remarks with the sentence: “Today, I have come bearing 
an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand” 
(Rackers 2004: 50). While invoking the olive branch and therefore a symbol of peace, Arafat 
threatens those who will not support a Palestinian right to self-determination and to their 
sacred homeland. To sum up, both speeches make use of crucial figurative language to 
underline their respective claims. This approach furthers the impression that to outweigh the 
other’s argumentation has been of greater importance than real efforts to implement a 
constructive dialogue. 
 
5.3) Benjamin Netanyahu – Speech at the UN General Assembly  
Benjamin Netanyahu is the current Israeli Prime Minister and Chairman of the Likud Party. 
According to Gerlach and Meier (2012), he had a main impact on moving the Israeli society 
further to the right. In 1996, he won the elections to become Prime Minister against Shimon 
Peres while his electoral campaign was marked by the slogan of the ‘Three No’s’: No to an 
independent Palestinian state. No to a return of the Golan Heights to Syria. No to discussions 
regarding the status of Jerusalem. His campaign could be interpreted as an echo of the three 
No’s of Khartoum, where eight political leaders from Arab countries released a resolution 
after the defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel on September 1, 1967. The resolution’s third 
paragraph constituted the ‘Three No’s’ to peace, recognition and negotiations with Israel. 
Netanyahu is further known for his sharp criticism of Yitzhak Rabin for his willingness to 
discuss the possibility of an autonomous Palestinian state during the Oslo Peace Process. 
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In his speech on September 22, 2016, in front of the United Nations General Assembly in 
New York, early in his remarks, he points at the “war against Israel at the UN” and asks if, 
“Given its history and hostility towards Israel, does anyone really believe that Israel will let 
the UN determine our security and our vital interests?” (Netanyahu 2016). By mentioning 
security, he underlines how this factor is of essential importance to Israeli policies in general. 
A profound criticism of the United Nations’ (UN) approach towards Israel could hardly have 
made sharper and been strengthened more as Netanyahu continues with condemning the UN 
for spending so much time with criticizing “the only liberal democracy in the Middle East” 
instead of addressing problems of real global scope which are “war, disease, poverty [and] 
climate change” (Netanyahu 2016). He goes on by demanding whether the half million 
slaughtered Syrians helped the UN in condemning Israel and thereby reveals the 
aforementioned scapegoat phenomenon.  
While one first gets the impression that Netanyahu’s speech is constructed around current and 
particularly secular world problems, religious references become prevalent in the course of his 
explanations. They obtain a key role as he attacks the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 
for having criticized the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and for preparing a lawsuit against 
Britain in this regard. In order to demonstrate how absurd this approach is in his eyes, he 
alludes to Abraham in the next paragraph and rhetorically questions why the Palestinians not 
also pursue to sue “Abraham for buying that plot of land in Hebron where the fathers and 
mothers of the Jewish people were buried 4,000 years ago” (Netanyahu 2016). As Benny 
Morris has elaborated, the Balfour Declaration became the “crucial international warrant for 
Zionism” at that time (Morris 1999: 73). While the declaration initially represented Britain’s 
intend to counter the French claims to Palestine successfully, it had extensive implications 
since it made Britain “the protector of Jewish self-determination” (ibid.). At this point, the 
Palestinians’ tragedy was initiated as they were viewed as the “insignificant natives” in 
contrast to the Jews, who were seen “as Europeans and as the rightful owners” of Palestine 
(ibid.). Moreover, remarks concerning religion also played a role in the Balfour Declaration, 
in which it was formulated “that noting shall be done which may prejudice the […] religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Morris 1999: 75).  
It is particularly significant for the securitization of the Palestinian counterparty that 
Netanyahu continues his speech with historical references, such as the Partition Resolution of 
1947 and in this context underlines the approval of the UN of “our moral rights in our 
homeland and to our homeland” at that time (Netanyahu 2016). Subsequently, the scapegoat 
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phenomenon is used again when he explains that “[if] the Palestinians [had] said yes to a 
Jewish state in 1947, there would have been no war, no refugees and no conflict” (Netanyahu 
2016). The profound criticism of the Palestinian position is particularly significant for a 
successful securitization process, which has the task to foster Israel’s standpoint on a world 
stage.  
On March 3, 2015, Benjamin Netanyahu held a speech at a joint Congress meeting in the 
United States. In it, Netanyahu’s severe criticism of the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons, 
which “threaten the survival of my country and the future of my people”, is, as basis for 
religious securitization, essential to regard (Netanyahu 2015). Netanyahu formulates an 
existential threat, which serves as initial point of the process. The threat obtains its religious 
connotation as Netanyahu, a secular Jew, which is striking in this regard, continues: 
“We’re an ancient people. In our nearly 4,000 years of history, many have tried repeatedly to destroy 
the Jewish people. Tomorrow night, on the Jewish holiday of Purim, we’ll read the Book of Esther. 
We’ll read of a powerful Persian viceroy named Haman, who plotted to destroy the Jewish people 
some 2,500 years ago. But a courageous Jewish woman, Queen Esther, exposed the plot and gave for 
the Jewish people the right to defend themselves against their enemies.[…] Today the Jewish people 
face another attempt by yet another Persian potentate to destroy us. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei…“(Netanyahu 2015).  
He further portrays the Iranian people as hijacked by “religious zealots who imposed on them 
immediately a dark and brutal dictatorship” (ibid.). The significance of the Jewish faith is 
portrayed as very core of the Israeli state, characterizing people, beliefs and existence, which 
are targeted through the Iranian approach. A final excerpt from Netanyahu’s closing remarks 
illustrates this and the extraordinary significance of the Jewish state, which is granted its 
position by God, an uncontestable higher evaluator who strengthens the Jewish people: 
“Facing me right up there in the gallery, overlooking all of us in this (inaudible) chamber is the image 
of Moses. Moses led our people from slavery to the gates of the Promised Land. And before the people 
of Israel entered the land of Israel, Moses gave us a message that has steeled our resolve for thousands 
of years. I leave you with his message today, (continues in Hebrew), Be strong and resolute, neither 
fear nor dread them” (Netanyahu 2015). 
While the second speech does not mention the Palestinian counterpart, it is a crucial example 
of the same religious securitization, which characterizes the Israeli role when confronting the 
Palestinian opponent and is worth analyzing as it demonstrates the potential of spillover 
effects to another Muslim nation, which is perceived as existential threat. 
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6.) Conclusion 
Religion deserves an explicit role in the study of IR, and within the framework of 
Securitization theory. In this context, Edward Luttwak (1994) has described religion as a 
missing dimension, which is not adequately dealt with by the mainstream theories of IR, and 
which only came to the fore with the events of September 11th. One danger has been to 
universalize generalizations on religion’s assumed “irrationality, emotion, and backwardness” 
(Hafez/Slyomovics 2013: 201). The difficulty of grasping religion as an essential factor often 
lies in its interdependence with other factors. Nonetheless, as shown, notions of religion were 
present in both the historical contexts as facilitating conditions for securitization and in the 
analyzed speeches by David Ben-Gurion, Yasser Arafat and Benjamin Netanyahu. While in 
some statements, faith constituted the center of the argument, in other situations religious 
legitimization has been used up to this day mainly to spur the enmity between Muslims and 
Jews, of which each claims their religious identity to be deeper rooted than the one of the 
opposing power. Religious remarks are used as an act of self-assurance, which simultaneously 
are assigned the duty to de-valorize the other side’s argument and to overcome insecurity by 
framing something as existential threat. Moreover, as initially elaborated, to include the divine 
always contains a moral correctness of a higher sphere that makes it particularly difficult for 
an addressed civil society to oppose the cause. 
IR theory continuously has framed religion as subcategory of concepts, such as society or 
civilization. I have argued that this is the wrong approach in view of the fact that religion not 
only combines both the potential for conflict reduction and for its deterioration. It likewise 
represents the only variable in the Israeli-Palestinian case which explicitly considers the 
spiritual roots of the conflict, that serve as essential parts of both national identities in 
response to the other and which are used to defend the own truth. IR still represents a field, 
which is dominated by Western scholars, who apply their assumptions about international 
relations on the non-West according to their Western experiences without taking the whole 
extent of local realities into consideration. Therefore, I strongly agree with Laustsen and 
Waever on the necessity to further research a separate religious sector within securitization 
theory since it is religion itself, which in the Israeli-Palestinian case study addresses the very 
core of existence through the reference to a divine entity, which guarantees this existence and 
is thus difficult to contest from an earthly standpoint. It is therefore of fundamental 
importance to start opening up for religion as an important element that progressively is 
linked to a notion of security that exceeds the normal bargaining processes of politics and can 
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thus be framed easily as existential threat to the constitution of a state. This represents a 
development, which ultimately may affect any state. Simultaneously, postcolonial voices must 
be included in assumptions on non-Western conflicts, otherwise IR theory will sooner than 
later run the risk of losing authenticity when claiming its results to be of global importance.  
The psychological level of the conflict cannot be denied (Senfft 2010: 6). Furthermore, 
political elites have repeatedly propagated slogans that undermine the other. They have a 
strong impact on whether the public opinion is characterized by peace or violence. At the 
same time, it remains unclear whether a suitable external moderator, which will be trusted by 
both sides, can be found at all. This also raises the question of moderators’ possibilities for 
action and their limits in general and whether other states may benefit from the maintenance 
of the conflict. If requested, external assistance needs to start implying the understanding of 
diverse, in this case religiously-driven, perspectives (Mani/Weiss 2011). The constant struggle 
of political leaders for power makes a reconciliatory process even more difficult. On the one 
hand, Israeli extremists will continually try to frame acute threats targeting the survival of the 
Israeli state and thereby shape a central electoral campaign based on fears with the potential to 
prevent any efforts towards peace (List 2006: 134). On the other hand, anti-Semitism is a 
major pillar in the ideology of the Palestinian-national-Islamic movement Hamas, which 
emphasizes the Islamic cause of the Palestinian state and which builds its harsh criticism of 
the Jewish side on the idea of a war of religion and faith (Litvak 2005).  
There has been the constant presence of unprocessed collective traumas on both sides, which 
have continued their impact over generations, provoking a mutual mistrust and a sense of 
imbalance. The question is also which narratives were redefined through a constant emphasis 
of certain factors from the past. Such narrative up-dating is as shown “commonly elite-
driven” (Ramet 2013: 879). Memories that matter for the creation of a more peaceful 
collective memory therefore became assets of political leaders’ intentions that could collide 
with societies’ needs to approve a process of de-securitization. At the same time, it is not to be 
neglected that the securitization process is an intersubjective development and is highly 
dependent on the individual perception of an existential threat.  
Religion must be taken into account when addressing the conflict, since all religions involved 
also contain vital linguistic skills to further de-securitization (Brocker et al. 2003). 
Additionally, “religions remain vital and meaningful through the actions of their carriers, who 
[…] shape them over long historical periods” (Eickelmann 1998: 241). In this context, the 
sacredness of holy sites, personal faith and the idea of the transcendence in diverse contexts 
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must be understood beforehand and not tried to be silenced by counter-arguing with 
modernity or secularization. The key for a further analysis must rather be to understand the 
close entanglement of several variables, such as religion and politics. As underlined in the 
previous chapters, the openness of the audience regarding the fruition of securitizing moves 
that invoke religion is essential for securitization to succeed.  If the Jewish and Palestinian 
civil societies manage to underline the similarities instead of insisting on the differences and 
thus encourage a society’s role change from audience to enunciator - a role that until now has 
been explicitly reserved for the political elites as elaborated in the third chapter of this work-, 
de-securitization is still something possible to be realized.  
As response to the initial research question, it was possible to show that religion, not solely 
but decisively fuels the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the international 
community still seems to lack in-depth research and adequate interest in analyzing religious 
components of conflicts, this attitude, if not changed, can cause negative consequences not 
only for the theory of IR but also for a right approach towards religiously motivated 
encounters and their successful resolutions. In light of this work’s research focus, a 
remarkably powerful example of de-securitization and religious references’ potential for 
conflict resolution can be observed in the ending passage of Yitzhak Rabin’s speech upon the 
signing of the Declaration of principles in 1993 following the Oslo peace process: 
“…our inner strength, our higher moral values have been derived for thousands of years from the 
Book of Books, in one of which, Koheleth (Ecclesiastes), we read, ‘To every thing there is a season, 
and a time to every purpose under heaven. […] A time to love, and a time to hate, a time of war and a 
time of peace.’ Ladies and gentlemen, the time of peace has come” (Rackers 2004: 171). 
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